

Definitions of Technical Terms

Accession The act whereby a state accepts the offer or the opportunity to become party to a treaty already negotiated and signed by other states. It has the same legal effect as ratification. Accession usually occurs after the treaty has entered into force.

Anti-corruption agencies Separate, permanent agencies with the primary function of providing centralized leadership in core areas of anti-corruption activity, including policy analysis and technical assistance in prevention, public outreach and information, monitoring, investigation, and prosecution.

Bribery The act of offering someone money, goods or services in order to persuade him or her to perform an action, often illegal, in the interests of the person offering the bribe.

Civil service Refers to the civilian employees of a government in the various ministries and includes teachers and policemen but not the military, judiciary or those employed in statutory boards or public enterprises.

Clientelism An informal form of social organization characterized by 'patron-client' relationships between people of different social and economic status: a 'patron' (relatively powerful and wealthy) and his/her 'clients' (relatively less powerful and wealthy). The relationship includes a mutual but unequal exchange of favours, which can be corrupt. (Patrimonial and clientelist

practices can institutionalize hegemonic elites and political corruption, often reaching the highest ranks of state power).

Collusion A usually secretive act of cooperation or collaboration among two or more parties to mislead or defraud others (of their rights).

Counterfeit drugs Medicines, which have been deliberately and fraudulently mislabelled with respect to identity and or source. Counterfeiting can apply to both branded and generic products and counterfeit products may include products with the correct ingredients or with the wrong ingredients, without active ingredients, with insufficient active ingredients or with fake packaging.

Cronyism Favouritism shown in treatment of friends and associates, without regard to their objective qualifications; could be treated as a form of corruption.

Cultural determinism Refers to a conviction that culture determines and dominates our behavioural and emotional approaches to issues of society and existence.

Cultural pluralism A term used when small groups within a larger society maintain their unique cultural identities. In a pluralist culture, unique groups not only coexist side by side, but also consider qualities of other groups as traits worth incorporating into their own culture.

Cultural relativism The principle that an individual human's beliefs and activities should be interpreted in terms of his or her own culture.

Dry departments Government offices that do traditional administrative work and have little contact with the public. Hence dry departments have reduced opportunities for corruption compared with 'wet departments'.

e-Governance Refers to government agencies' use of information technology (such as internet and mobile computing) that have the anticipated ability to transform and improve relations with citizens, businesses and other arms of government, as well as reducing corruption.

Embezzlement The misappropriation of property or money by a person in a formal position of trust or responsibility over those assets. Could also be a form of corruption, depending on the definition adopted.

Extortion Unlawful demand or receipt of money or favour through the use of force or intimidation.

Extradition Legal surrender by one country to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offence within the jurisdiction of the other country.

Favouritism Abuse of power to favour friends and relatives over others. It can be a form of corruption, for example when a public officer gives priority to his/her family members.

Fraud An economic crime involving misrepresentation done to obtain unlawful gains.

Free-riders In the context of this report: individuals, concluding that reduced corruption will benefit nearly everyone, leave the hard work and risks of reform to others, knowing they stand to benefit from any successes whether they have participated or not.

Gift economy An 'economic system' in which goods and services are given without any explicit agreement for immediate or future *quid pro quo*. Typically, a 'gift economy' occurs in a culture or subculture that emphasizes social or intangible rewards for generosity and gratitude. In some cases, simultaneous or recurring giving serves to circulate and redistribute valuables within a community. This can be considered a form of reciprocal altruism. Sometimes, there is an implicit expectation of the return of comparable goods or services, political support, or the gift being later passed on to a third party.

Ghost institutions Institutions that show up on account books but do not actually exist anywhere. Examples include 'ghost schools' that process vouchers without providing education; a form of corruption.

Ghost workers Staff that show up on account books but do not actually exist in reality. They are fictitious workers invented to siphon off resources by corrupt persons.

Graft (Verb) To obtain money dishonestly by exploiting one's position of power or authority. (Noun) The rewards of corruption: the loot, booty, payoffs, or spoils.

Grand corruption Corruption involving substantial amounts of money and usually high-level officials to secure commercial contracts or some other business advantage.

Grease money Facilitation payments, usually small amounts of money given to officials to make things move more smoothly and speedily. Usually associated with petty corruption.

Integrity system An integrity system is a political and administrative arrangement that encourages integrity (adherence to a set of moral or ethical principles). A country's *National Integrity System* (NIS) comprises the whole of government and non-governmental institutions, laws and practices that can, if functioning properly, minimize levels of corruption and mismanagement. The concept of NIS has been developed and promoted by Transparency International as a framework with which to analyse corruption in a given national context, as well as the adequacy and effectiveness of national anti-corruption efforts.

Kickback An illegal secret payment made as a return for a favour or service rendered; a form of corruption.

Lobbying An attempt to influence an outcome in favour of or against a specific cause, typically directed at government and elected officials.

Money laundering The process whereby the origin of funds generated by illegal means is concealed so that it appears to come from a legitimate source. Money laundering is often used to disguise the proceeds of corruption, and aims at inserting them into economic circulation.

Nepotism Granting offices, contracts and benefits to friends and relatives, regardless of merit.

Perks Refer to entitlements or favours

bestowed upon an individual based on the office/position held.

Petty corruption Corruption involving smaller sums and typically involving more junior officials; also known as administrative corruption or retail corruption. It covers everyday corruption that takes place at the implementation end of policies, where public officials interact with the public. Petty corruption is bribery in connection with the implementation of existing laws, rules and regulations.

Political will The demonstrated and credible intent of political actors to attack perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level.

Principal-agent model Explains how corruption occurs when an agent betrays the power entrusted in him/her by a principal to pursue his/her own interest by accepting or seeking a benefit from a service seeker, the client.

Ratification Defines the international act whereby a state indicates its consent to be bound to a treaty if the parties intended to show their consent by such an act.

Red tape Excessive formal rules and procedures, which increases the potential for corrupt interactions and impedes/retards people's access to public services. 'Speed money' is often paid to bypass red tape and speed up transactions.

Relationship banking A long-term, intimate and relatively open relationship established between a corporation and its banks. Banks often supply a range of tailor-made services rather than one-off services. In Japan, Relationship Banking is known as

Kairetsu – a term also used in many other East Asian countries during and following the economic crisis.

Rent seeking Rent seeking generally implies the extraction of uncompensated value from others without making any contribution to productivity, such as by gaining control of land and other pre-existing natural resources, or by imposing burdensome regulations or other government decisions that may affect consumers or businesses. Rent seeking in the aggregate may impose substantial losses on society.

Right to information legislation Legislation that gives all citizens and organizations a legal right to demand and obtain information from public bodies and those who are performing public functions, and an obligation on all public bodies to publish, on a proactive or routine basis, key categories of information.

Speed money Bribes paid to quicken the delivery of services delayed by bureaucratic holdup (red tape) and shortage of resources.

State capture Where the state is held captive to the actions of individuals, groups, or firms who influence the formation of laws, rules, and regulations to serve their private

interests by offering private benefits to public officials, changing the rules of the game. It is a way of ‘legalizing’ corruption.

System of checks and balances A mechanism that allows each branch of a government to amend or veto acts of another branch so as to prevent any other branch from exerting too much power.

Tax haven A country or independent region where there are no or nominal taxes and there is lack of transparency and minimal exchange of information.

Wet departments Government offices that deal with many people outside government and are typically concerned with money, planning, banking, or public enterprises. They are also usually generous with honoraria, allowances, service on committees and boards, and carry many opportunities for foreign training ‘wet’ departments are more vulnerable to corruption than ‘dry’ departments because of their bigger budgets and access to the public.

Whistle-blower protection Measures (administrative or legislative) to protect people who alert the public or the authorities about corrupt transactions they have witnessed or uncovered. Whistle-blower protection shields these people from reprisals, from those they expose.

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